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Abstract
Using personnel data, we compare worker productivity under a relative incentive scheme
-where pay is based on individual productivity relative to the average productivity of the
group- to productivity under piece rates.
We ﬁnd that productivity is at least 50% higher under piece rates. Further analysis
shows this is due to workers partially internalizing the negative externality their eﬀort
imposes on others under the relative incentive scheme. Workers internalize this externality
to a greater extent when they work with fewer co-workers, and a greater share of their co-
workers are their close friends. The relationship among workers has no aﬀect on productivity
under piece rates.
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11 Introduction
Relative incentive schemes - where an individual’s reward depends on her performance relative
to others’ - are ubiquitous in society. In the classroom, students are graded on a curve; on the
sports ﬁeld, sportsmen and women are rewarded relative to their competitors; and in business,
managers compete for promotion.
In this paper we use personnel data to compare the eﬀect of relative and absolute incentive
schemes on workers’ productivity. Workers in our sample are fruit pickers on a leading UK farm.
Workers’ individual productivity - deﬁned as kilograms of fruit picked per hour - is recorded
daily over the entire picking season. We ﬁrst observe workers under a relative incentive scheme
where pay depends on individual productivity relative to the average productivity among all co-
workers. The same workers are then observed under an absolute incentive scheme - piece rates -
where pay depends only on individual productivity.1
We provide two sets of results in this paper. First, we identify the causal eﬀect of the change
in incentive schemes on workers’ productivity. Second, we provide evidence on how individuals
behave in a situation where individual and social optima do not coincide - namely under a
relative incentive scheme where each worker’s eﬀort imposes a negative externality on co-workers
by lowering their relative performance.2 To this purpose, we exploit data on each worker’s
social network which allows us to assess whether workers’ behavior depends on the identity of
co-workers who suﬀer from the externality.
Three features of the data help identify the causal eﬀect on worker productivity of the change
in incentive schemes. First, we use information on the daily productivity of the same workers
before and after the introduction of the piece rates. Time invariant sources of unobservable
individual heterogeneity such as worker ability and intrinsic motivation are therefore controlled
for.3
1This is the ﬁrst empirical comparison of absolute and relative incentive schemes in the workplace. Knoeber
and Thurman (1994) analyze the eﬀects of two diﬀerent relative incentive schemes on chicken ranchers. The theory
of rank order tournaments - a type of relative incentive - has been tested in experimental data (Bull et al (1987))
and in sports tournaments (Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990), Becker and Huselid (1992)). Lazear (2000) and
Paarsch and Shearer (1996) show that incentives matter per se -b o t hﬁnd sizeable gains in worker productivity
when moving from ﬁxed pay to piece rates. Similarly, Laﬀont and Matoussi (1995) ﬁnd worker productivity to
be 50% higher in farms operated under high powered (ﬁxed rent) contracts compared to those operated under
low powered (sharecropping) contracts. Finally, Foster and Rosenzweig (1994) show that eﬀort, proxied by the
depletion of BMI net of calorie intake, is 22% higher for rural laborers paid by piece rates compared to those paid
hourly wages.
2As made precise in section 2, under relative incentives individual worker’s eﬀort increases average productivity
thus reducing other co-workers’ pay, all else equal. In contrast, under piece rates, worker’s eﬀort does not aﬀect
other co-workers’ pay.
3This is in contrast to studies that use cross-sectional or time-series variation across ﬁrms to measure incentive
eﬀects. If workers are not randomly allocated across ﬁrms, unobserved worker heterogeneity biases such estimates
of the eﬀect of incentives on productivity.
2Second, the total stock of workers on the farm remains constant over the season. Hence
there is no endogenous sorting of new workers into the sample. Furthermore, as we compare the
productivity of the same worker before and after the change in regime, there is no endogenous
attrition of workers out of the sample. This is important given existing evidence suggesting the
quantitative eﬀects on productivity of the endogenous sorting of workers in response to a change
in incentives, are at least as strong as those arising from the incentives directly.4
Third, the change in incentive scheme was unannounced to workers beforehand. Moreover, no
other farm practices changed with the change in incentives. Tasks, technology and management
were the same under both incentives schemes.
Our main results are as follows. The change in incentive schemes had a signiﬁcant and
permanent impact on productivity; for the average worker productivity increased by at least
50%. The result is robust to controlling for a host of time varying factors at the worker, ﬁeld,
and farm level.
The productivity gains accrued to management and were not shared with workers. In partic-
ular, workers’ pay and hours remained constant under both incentive schemes, while productivity
increased, indicating that the change in incentive schemes made the average worker worse oﬀ.5
We also provide evidence that the increase in productivity did not come at the expense of a lower
quality of fruit picking.
Next, we investigate whether workers choose their eﬀort to maximize their individual utility
under both incentive schemes, namely whether they ignore the negative externality their eﬀort
imposes on their co-workers under relative incentives. In a stylized model of eﬀort choices un-
der the two incentive schemes, the Nash equilibrium indeed entails lower eﬀort under relative
incentives vis-à-vis piece rates.
Estimation of the ﬁrst order conditions for worker’s eﬀo r tc h o i c eh o w e v e rr e v e a l st h a tt h e
observed change in productivity is too large to be consistent with individual utility maximization.
In that model, eﬀort is lower under relative incentives because higher eﬀort leads to higher average
productivity and hence lower pay. For the group sizes observed in the data this eﬀect is too small
to account for the observed change in productivity.6
Further analysis indicates that workers’ behavior under relative incentives is not consistent
4Lazear (2000) uses worker level data to analyze the eﬀect on installers of auto windshields of moving from
ﬁxed wage contracts to piece rates. He ﬁnds an increase in productivity of 44% six months after the change in
incentives. Half of this is attributed to the endogenous turnover of workers.
5As discussed later, the estimated increase in productivity of 50% is therefore a lower bound on the pure eﬀect
of the change in incentives, holding worker utility constant.
6When workers are homogeneous the magnitude of this eﬀect is of order 1
N,w h e r eN is the number of co-
workers. The average group size in our sample is 40. Evidence of the “ 1
N problem”, whereby individuals appear
to overestimate their impact on others has also been found in the literature on team incentives (Hamilton et al
(2003)), employee stock option plans (Jones and Kato (1995)), ﬁrm wide performance bonuses (Knez and Simester
(2001), and experimental public goods games (Fehr and Gachter (2000)).
3with the group optimum either. Namely, eﬀort levels are too high to be consistent with workers
fully internalizing the negative externality their eﬀort imposes on others. We then posit workers
to have social preferences, namely they place some weight on the beneﬁts accruing to their co-
workers. We ﬁnd that the observed change in productivity is consistent with the average worker
placing around twice the weight on their own private beneﬁts, as on the beneﬁts accruing to all
others.
Finally, we ask whether the extent to which workers internalize the externality depends on
their relationship with other members of the group. Using data on each worker’s social network,
we ﬁnd that under relative incentives workers indeed choose lower eﬀort when the share of
personal friends in the group is larger and that this eﬀect is stronger in smaller groups.
In contrast, we ﬁnd that productivity under piece rates is not aﬀected by the relationships
among co-workers. This helps rule out the hypotheses that productivity is lower when friends
are present because workers socialize with their friends, because of a norm of not working hard
in the presence of friends, or because workers self select to work alongside their friends when
they do not intend to work hard.
The contributions of this paper are twofold. First, we provide evidence on the eﬀect of
relative, compared to absolute, incentive schemes on worker productivity. The personnel data is
rich enough to allow us to circumvent a number of econometric concerns that generally plague
empirical studies of the eﬀect of incentives on productivity.
Second, we shed light on why workers behave diﬀerently under the two schemes. In doing
so, we integrate the recent work on social preferences - that has largely been motivated by
experimental evidence - with the literature on the provision of incentives.7
These ﬁndings provide useful information for further developments of incentive theory and
more generally, for the understanding of individual behavior in common resource management
and other situations in which individual and social optima do not coincide.
To be clear, throughout we take the incentive schemes as given. The focus of this paper is
the response of workers to a change in incentives. In the conclusion, we return to the issue of
whether the observed incentive schemes are indeed optimally designed.
The paper is organized into 7 sections. Section 2 sets out stylized models of worker’s eﬀort
choices under the two incentive schemes. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents
estimates of the causal eﬀect of the change in incentives on productivity. Section 5 brings
alternative models of workers’ behavior to the data. Section 6 analyzes the eﬀect of social
networks on productivity under the two incentive schemes. Section 7 concludes. The appendix
contains proofs and additional regression results.
7Prendergast (1999) reviews the incentives literature. Fehr et al (1999) and Fehr and Fischbacher (2002)
review the literature on social preferences.
42 Theoretical Framework
To establish the null hypothesis of the eﬀect of the change in incentives on worker productivity
we present stylized models of workers’ eﬀort choices under relative incentives and piece rates.
Consider a group of N workers. Each worker i exerts ei ≥ 0 units of eﬀort which determines
his productivity. For simplicity we assume that eﬀort is observable. Workers are heterogeneous
and the disutility to worker i is
θie2
i
2 ,w h e r eθi is interpreted as the inverse of the workers innate
ability. Assume workers can be ordered such that θ1 <θ 2 <. . .<θ N,w h e r eθi > 0 for all i.
Under a relative incentive scheme, each worker’s remuneration depends on how she performs








i ei is the average eﬀort of all N workers, and φ(.) is a diﬀerentiable concave function,
with lime→0 φ
0 (e)=∞.8
Under piece rates, each worker’s remuneration depends on her eﬀort alone which is paid at
rate β per unit. Under piece rates worker i’s utility from pay is then φ(βei).
We analyze the Nash equilibrium when workers simultaneously choose their eﬀort.9

















The key characteristic of a relative incentive scheme is that as each worker i exerts eﬀort, her









The logic behind this is straightforward. By exerting eﬀort, each worker increases the average
level of eﬀort, thus reducing the relative performance of others. In short, by exerting eﬀort under
relative incentives, each worker imposes a negative externality on co-workers. The nature of eﬀort
choices among workers is therefore similar to that in a tragedy of the commons type of game.
Under piece rates, worker’s beneﬁts depends only on her own eﬀo r ta n dt h ep i e c er a t e ,β.
8This relative incentive scheme is not a rank order tournament. Worker beneﬁts are based on their cardinal
and not their ordinal ranking. It is however similar to a “linear relative performance evaluation” (LRPE) scheme
as studied in Knoeber and Thurman (1994). Under a LRPE worker’s compensation is;
max
ei




where α and µ are taken as given by workers.
9By analyzing workers’ choice in a static framework we implicitly rule out the analysis of dynamic incentives
within each scheme. In particular, workers might want to underperform to make sure that the management does
not lower the pay rate in future periods. We discuss some of the empirical implications of this ratchet eﬀect in
section four.








To compare eﬀorts under the two schemes, evaluate the ﬁrst order conditions of problems (1)
and (2) at β = 1
e so that for a given average eﬀort level, the marginal beneﬁto fe ﬀort is the same
under both incentive schemes.
Proposition 1: In the Nash equilibrium each worker exerts less eﬀort under relative incen-
tives than under piece rates. The variance of eﬀort is also lower under relative incentives.










































This is due to the fact that under relative incentives an increase in eﬀort increases the average
eﬀort and hence decreases the remuneration of worker i. Stylized eﬀort schedules under both
incentive schemes are shown in ﬁgure A below;
Insert ﬁgure A about here
The diﬀerence in eﬀort is greatest for the most able workers - namely those with the lowest
θ. Workers that suﬀer a high disutility from eﬀort exert more similar levels of eﬀort under the
two schemes.
Ak e yp o i n ti st h a tt h ed i ﬀerence in eﬀort across the schemes depends on group size. As group









to 1 and the diﬀerence in eﬀort between the two schemes tends to zero.10
10This is seen most clearly in the case of homogeneous workers. Then the Nash equilibrium eﬀort level under
relative incentives is e∗






0 (1) and e∗
i = eP =
p
φ
0 (1) under piece rates, as detailed in the





. If workers are heterogeneous the ratio
depends on group size and worker’s ability.
6As discussed in more detail later, the group sizes observed in our data are large. Under the
relative incentive scheme the average eﬀort is calculated over about 40 co-workers. For conceiv-
able distributions of underlying ability, we would not therefore expect large changes in Nash
equilibrium eﬀorts moving from relative incentives to piece rates, if this framework accurately
captures the eﬀort choice problem of workers under the two incentive schemes.
3 Context and Data Description
3.1 Context
We analyze data from a leading UK soft fruit farm for the 2002 season. We use personnel records
in combination with information on workers’ characteristics from questionnaires we administered
to the workers directly. Workers in the sample are hired seasonally to pick fruit across a number
of ﬁelds within the farm.
We observe workers being paid ﬁrst according to a relative and then according to an absolute
incentive scheme. In both cases workers face a compensation schedule of the form;
compensation = βKi
where Ki is the total kilograms of fruit picked by worker i in the day.11 Throughout we deﬁne
individual productivity yi as the number of kilograms of fruit Ki picked per hour.
Under the relative scheme, the picking rate β is endogenously determined by the average





where w is the minimum wage, c is a constant set by the management at the beginning of the
season, and y is the average hourly productivity of all workers on the ﬁeld-day. As higher eﬀort
leads to higher productivity, an increase in worker i’s eﬀort imposes a negative externality on
her co-workers by increasing the average productivity on the ﬁeld-day thus reducing the picking
rate β.
In line with the relative scheme analyzed in section 2, worker i ’s compensation depends on
her productivity relative to the average productivity of her co-workers. In particular, given that
11To comply with minimum wage laws, workers’ compensation is supplemented whenever βKi falls below the
pro-rata minimum wage. In practice the farm management makes clear that any worker who needs to have their
compensation increased to the minimum wage level repeatedly would be ﬁred. Indeed, we observe less than 1%
of all worker-ﬁeld-day observations involving pay increases to meet the minimum wage requirements. Of these,
46% occurred under relative incentives, 54% occurred under piece rates.
7Ki = yi ∗ h,w h e r eh is the number of hours worked in a day, worker i ’s pay can be written as
yi
y h(w + c).
At the start of each ﬁeld-day, the ﬁeld supervisor announces an ex ante picking rate based
on her expectations of worker productivity. This picking rate can then be revised at the end of
each ﬁeld-day to ensure the average worker earns the pre-established hourly wage, w + c.
Under piece rates, the picking rate is set ex ante, again based on the supervisor’s expectation
of productivity that ﬁeld-day. This picking rate cannot be revised. The key diﬀerence between
the two systems is that under the relative incentives, workers’ eﬀort aﬀects the rate at which
they are paid, whereas under piece rates it does not.12
We analyze productivity data on one type of fruit only and focus on the season’s peak time -
between mid May and the end of August. Data on workers’ productivity is recorded electronically.
Each worker is assigned a unique bar code, which is used to track the quantity of fruit they pick
on each ﬁeld and day in which they work. This ensures little or no measurement error in recorded
productivity.
The sample is restricted to those workers who worked at least 10 ﬁeld-days under each in-
centive scheme. Our working sample contains 10215 worker-ﬁeld-day level observations, covering
142 workers, 22 ﬁelds and 108 days in total.
The incentive scheme changed midway through the season. Relative incentives were in place
for the ﬁrst 54 days, piece rates were in place for the remaining 54.13 The change was announced
o nt h es a m ed a yi tw a sﬁrst implemented and it was therefore unexpected by the workers. No
other organizational change took place during the season, as reported by farm management and
as documented in the next section.
From interviews with the management, we know that the relative incentive scheme was
adopted for two reasons. First, the relative scheme allows to diﬀerence out common shocks,
such as those deriving from weather and ﬁeld conditions, that are a key determinant of produc-
tivity in this setting. Second, the relative scheme gives the management more control over the
total wage bill. Eventually, the management decided to move to piece rates because they felt
12Workers face more uncertainty over the picking rate under relative incentives because although a rate is
announced ex ante,t h i sc a nb er e v i s e dex post to reﬂect the productivity of the average worker. Under piece
rates, the ex ante picking rate cannot be revised. In this context, however, uncertainty is unlikely to have a large
impact on eﬀort choices. First, since the workers play the same game daily they have suﬃcient information to
form expectations on the "typical" adjustments of the picking rate under the relative system. Second, the data
under piece rates indicates that, other things equal, supervisors get the ex−ante rate right. The announced rate
under piece rates is generally identical to the rate that would obtain if the relative formula were used.
13No picking takes place on Sundays. The panel is unbalanced in that we do not observe each worker picking
every day. This is of concern if there is endogenous attrition of either ﬁelds or workers over time. We ameliorate
the latter of these concerns by restricting the sample to workers who worked at least 10 ﬁeld-days under each
scheme. To address the ﬁrst concern, we later exploit only variation in productivity within the same ﬁeld over
time.
8productivity could have been higher. Assessing whether the move to piece rates had the desired
eﬀect is the task of the next section.
Finally, workers in the sample are hired on a casual basis, namely work is oﬀered daily with
no guarantee of further employment. All workers are hired from Eastern and Central Europe
and live on the farm for the duration of their stay.14 Workers are issued with a farm-speciﬁc
work permit for a maximum of six months, implying they cannot be legally employed elsewhere
in the UK. Their outside option is therefore to return to their home countries. The vast majority
of workers in the sample report their main reason to seek temporary employment in the UK is
ﬁnancial, which is hardly surprising in light of the fact that, even at the minimum wage, the
value of their earnings is remarkably high in real terms.15
3.2 Descriptive Analysis
Worker Productivity
Table 1 gives unconditional worker productivity, by incentive scheme. Productivity rose
signiﬁcantly from an average of 5.01kg/hr in the ﬁrst half of the picking season under relative
incentives, to 7.98kg/hr in the second half of the season under piece rates. This corresponds to
an unconditional increase in productivity of 59%.
To minimize spurious variation in productivity due to other factors changing between the
two halves of the season, the remaining rows of table 1 report productivity data for diﬀerent
subsamples. We ﬁrst restrict the sample to workers whose only task was picking on a given
day. This eliminates variation in productivity arising from diﬀerences across time in non-picking
tasks done by ﬁeld-day. This would be of concern if, for instance, at the start of the season
workers exert relatively more eﬀort into non-picking tasks such as planting. On ﬁeld-days in
which workers are only picking, the rise in productivity is quantitatively similar to the sample
as a whole.16
The third row restricts the sample to ten days either side of the change in incentive scheme.
This minimizes the variation in productivity arising from varying ﬁeld conditions, ﬁeld compo-
sition, management practices, and workers endogenously leaving after the change in incentive
scheme. For instance, suppose low yield ﬁelds were less likely to be picked over time. This
attrition of ﬁelds would cause productivity to rise over the season. Over this shorter time frame,
14In order to qualify, individuals must be full-time students, studying in Eastern and Central Europe, and
having at least one year before graduation. Workers must - (i) return to the same university in the autumn; (ii)
be able to speak English; (iii) have not worked in the UK before; (iv) be aged between 19 and 25.
15Working eight hours at the minimum wage rate implies a daily income of 32 GBP, i.e. about 55 USD or
14300 USD per year (based on a ﬁve-day week)..PPP adjusted GDP per capita is 3816 USD in the poorest of
the sample countries (Ukraine) and 11243 USD in the richest (Slovakia).
16The number of ﬁelds worked per day by each worker also remained constant over the season.
9there remains a signiﬁcant rise in productivity moving from one incentive scheme to the other.
The ﬁnal row restricts the sample to workers picking on the two main ﬁelds that operated
for the most amount of time under both incentive schemes. Since ﬁelds are contiguous and
planted with the same variety of fruit, this eliminates the variation in productivity arising from
diﬀerences across ﬁelds. Productivity rises signiﬁcantly in these ﬁelds.
Productivity is computed as kilograms picked per hour. Further analysis reveals that the
increase in productivity was entirely due to workers picking more fruit over the same time period,
rather than working shorter hours. Workers picked on average 23.2 more kilograms per day under
piece rates (signiﬁcant at the 1% level) while hours worked did not signiﬁcantly change across
incentive schemes, remaining constant at just over 8 hours per day.
Figures 1 and 2 show disaggregated productivity data across time and across workers under
the two schemes. Figure 1 shows the mean of worker productivity over time in the two ﬁelds that
were operated for the most days under each incentive scheme. Together these ﬁelds contribute one
third of the total worker-ﬁeld-day observations. Under relative incentives, there is no discernible
trend in productivity. With the introduction of piece rates, productivity rose and remained at
this higher level until the end of the season.
Figure 2 shows kernel density estimates of productivity by each incentive scheme. The pro-
ductivity of each of the 142 workers in the sample is averaged within each incentive scheme in
this ﬁgure. In line with table 1, the mean and variance of productivity both rise moving from
relative incentives to piece rates.
Aggregate Farm Level Data
Figure 3 shows the cumulative distributions of arrivals and departures of workers over the
season. The change in incentive scheme did not coincide with a wave of new arrivals, nor did it
hasten the departure of workers. Indeed, very few workers left before or just after the change in
incentive schemes.
Figures 4a to 4c show total kilograms picked, total man-hours worked, and the total number
of pickers over the season at the level of the farm. Each series is measured as a percentage
deviation from its mean.
Kilograms picked per day shows no discernible trend under either incentive scheme.17 Total
man-hours spent picking are higher under relative incentives and ﬁgure 4c shows this is due
entirely to more workers picking rather than each worker picking for longer hours. Under piece
rates, the total kilograms picked in aggregate remains at the same level as under relative incen-
tives. The total man-hours spent picking however falls as fewer workers are required to pick each
17Given the farm faces a relatively constant product demand and labor supply through the season, there is a
deliberate timing of planting of ﬁelds to ensure that not all fruit ripens simultaneously. This helps smooth out
variations in productivity over time.
10day.
Figures 4a to 4c together indicate that while total kilograms picked and the time spent
picking per ﬁeld-day remained constant throughout the season, the total number of workers that
were required to pick fell after the introduction of the piece rate. Some workers were therefore
reallocated to alternative tasks, and this is one source of gains that accrued to management
arising from the change in incentive scheme.
Group size, namely the number of workers working on the same ﬁeld at the same time, re-
mained constant throughout the season. Average group size was 41.1 under relative incentives
and 38.1 under piece rates, the diﬀerence being not statistically diﬀerent from zero. Since on
average there are over 40 workers picking together under the relative incentive scheme, the diﬀer-
ence in productivity across schemes should be orders of magnitude smaller than those reported
in table 1 if - (i) workers chose their eﬀort according to the Nash equilibrium set out in section
2; (ii) there is no natural increase in productivity over the season.
Picking Rate and Daily Pay
Figure 5a shows the picking rate paid per kilogram over time, as a percentage deviation from
its mean. Under relative incentives the picking rate rises gradually as productivity declines. This
is as expected given the picking rate is set according to (5) under the relative incentive scheme.
With the introduction of piece rates there is a one-oﬀ fall in the picking rate. The diﬀerence
in average picking rates between the two halves of the season is .105, signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
We can therefore rule out that the observed rise in productivity is a consequence of higher returns
to the marginal unit of eﬀort under piece rates. To the contrary, the marginal return to eﬀort is
lower under piece rates, indicating that our estimates provide a lower bound of the eﬀect of the
change in incentives in productivity.18
Figure 5b then shows the daily pay from picking over the season, as a percentage deviation
from its mean. Given that productivity and picking rates are inversely related to each other, it is
no surprise that workers’ pay remained relatively constant over time. The diﬀerence in average
daily pay between relative incentives and piece rate is indeed not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero. Average daily pay fell for the least productive workers and rose for the most productive.
Overall, the average worker became worse oﬀ under piece rates - their productivity rose, while
total compensation remained the same.
Given that these gains in productivity accrued largely to the farm management and not to
pickers, suggests picking rates were set optimally from the management’s point of view. In other
18We maintain the standard assumption in the incentive literature that the utility maximizing level of eﬀort is
increasing in the piece rate. Two reasons make strong income eﬀects very unlikely in this context. First, workers
had no choice over the number of hours worked, implying they could not revise their labor supply choice on the
extensive margin. Second, workers on the farm had the opportunity to earn very high wages (in real terms) for
a limited amount of time.
11words, there is little evidence of learning over the season by management on how much workers
would be able to pick each ﬁeld-day.
4 Evidence on Workers’ Productivity
4.1 Empirical Method
We assume the underlying production technology is Cobb Douglas, and estimate the productivity
of worker i on ﬁeld f on day t, yift, using the following panel data regression, where all continuous
variables are in logarithms;
yift = αi + βf + γPt + δXift + ηZft+ uift (6)
Worker ﬁxed eﬀects, αi, capture time invariant worker level determinants of productivity such
as workers innate ability and intrinsic motivation. Field ﬁxed eﬀects, βf, capture time invariant
ﬁeld level determinants of productivity such as soil quality and fruit variety.
Pt is a dummy equal to one after the piece rate is introduced, and zero otherwise. As the
piece rate is introduced simultaneously across all ﬁelds it is not possible to control for day ﬁxed
eﬀects. Instead we control for time varying factors at both the individual and ﬁeld level, in Xift
and Zft respectively.
The disturbance term, uift, captures unobservable determinants of productivity at the worker-
ﬁeld-day level. Worker observations within the same ﬁeld-day are unlikely to be independent since
workers face similar ﬁeld conditions. We account for this by clustering standard errors at the
ﬁeld-day level in all productivity regressions.
The parameter of interest throughout is γ. In the next section after presenting the baseline
estimates of (6), we address a number of concerns that may lead to γ being inconsistently
estimated. These arise from - (i) omitted time varying factors at the worker, ﬁeld, or farm level,
that cause productivity to rise over the picking season, biasing b γ upwards; (ii) the endogenous
attrition of low yield ﬁelds over time. This type of survivor bias also biases b γ upwards; (iii)
potentially endogenous responses of workers before or after the change in incentive scheme; (iv)
a potential endogenous timing of the change in incentives as management respond to lower than
anticipated productivity in the ﬁr s th a l fo ft h es e a s o n ,b i a s i n gb γ upwards.
4.2 Results
Table 2 presents the baseline estimates of the causal eﬀect of the change in incentive scheme on
worker productivity. Column 1 regresses worker productivity on a dummy for the introduction
12of the piece rate, clustering standard errors by ﬁeld-day. Productivity signiﬁcantly rises by 53%
when moving from relative incentives to piece rates.19
Column 2 controls for worker ﬁxed eﬀects, so that only variation within a worker over time is
exploited, while column 3 also adds ﬁeld ﬁxed eﬀects, so only variation within a worker picking
on the same ﬁeld over time is exploited. The coeﬃcient of interest remains signiﬁcant and of
similar magnitude.
The last column controls for other time varying determinants of productivity at the level of
the farm, ﬁeld, and individual.
First, we include a linear time trend to capture farm level changes over time. For example,
if management become better informed about the quality of ﬁelds and workers, the allocation of
resources over time improves and this leads to productivity gains.
Second, the yield within each ﬁeld may vary over the season. To capture such ﬁeld level
changes over time, we include a measure of each ﬁeld’s life cycle - the number of days that the
ﬁeld has been operated on at any moment in time, divided by the total number of days that the
ﬁeld is operated over the season.
Finally, workers may be more productive in the second half of the season when they have
acquired more picking experience. We therefore control for each worker’s picking experience -
the number of ﬁeld-days the worker has been picking.20
Column 4 controls for these time varying factors at the level of the farm, ﬁeld, and worker.
There is no trend in productivity over time at the level of the farm, all else equal. Within each
ﬁeld, productivity declines as the ﬁeld is picked later in its cycle. There are positive returns
to picking experience as expected.21 A one standard deviation increase in the ﬁeld life cycle
reduces productivity by 20%, while a one standard deviation increase in picking experience
increases productivity by 7%. In contrast, the introduction of piece rates causes productivity to
signiﬁcantly increase by 58%.
Omitted Factors
Table 3 controls for other time varying factors. First, any improvement in meteorological
conditions in the second of the season would cause productivity to rise even in the absence of
19We experimented with a number of alternative speciﬁcations for calculating standard errors. First we allowed
observations to be clustered at the worker level to account for idiosyncratic worker characteristics that lead to
worker productivity over diﬀerent days being correlated. Doing so caused standard errors to fall relative to those
in column 1. Second, we also ignored time variation altogether and collapsed the data into a single observation for
each worker under each incentive scheme. Doing so, we continued to ﬁnd that productivity increases signiﬁcantly,
at the 1% level after the change in incentive scheme. This and other results not reported for reasons of space are
available upon request.
20Management informed us that it takes a worker between 6 and 10 days before they are able to pick at their
optimal speed. For the ﬁrst 3 or 4 days of picking, workers are paid an hourly wage. This initial period of learning
is not in our sample.
21Deﬁning work experience as the cumulative hours spent picking also led to similar results as those reported.
13piece rates. Column 1 controls for daily meteorological conditions - the maximum and minimum
temperatures, and hours of sunshine. Doing so, the eﬀect of piece rates on productivity remains
largely as before.22
The actual farm management remained the same over the picking season. However there
remains a concern that management practices may have changed with the change in incentive
scheme. The earlier descriptive analysis showed that some practices, such as the length of the
working day or number of workers in each ﬁeld, did not change over the season. Another relevant
practice is the allocation of supervisors to ﬁelds. If the allocation of supervisor talent altered
with the incentive scheme, part of the observed rise in productivity may be due to this.
The personnel data allows us to identify the supervisor(s) present on each ﬁeld-day. Column
2 controls for supervisor ﬁxed eﬀects so that the eﬀect of the change in incentives is identiﬁed
from variation in productivity of the same worker, on the same ﬁeld, working under the same
supervisor, over the two incentive schemes. We continue to ﬁnd the introduction of piece rates
led to a signiﬁcant increase in productivity, controlling for the allocation of supervisor talent.
Finally, the ratio of supervisors to workers may have risen over the season. If so, workers
w o u l db em o r ea b l et os h i r kw h e nt h er e l a t i v ei n c e n t i v es c h e m ew a si np l a c e ,a g a i nb i a s i n gb γ
upwards. Column 3 shows the earlier results to be robust to controlling for the ratio of supervisors
to workers.
Alternative Comparison Groups
A st h ec h a n g ei ni n c e n t i v es c h e m eo c c u r sa tt h es a m et i m ei na l lﬁelds, identiﬁcation of the
eﬀect of incentives on productivity arises from a comparison over time of the same worker under
the two schemes. Table 4 considers the eﬀect of incentives on productivity for subsamples in
which the variation in productivity is less likely to be due to other time varying factors. These
subsamples correspond to those for which the unconditional diﬀerences in productivity were
reported in table 1.
We ﬁr s tr e s t r i c tt h es a m p l et ow o r k e r st h a th a v eonly been picking each day. This reduces
the variation in productivity arising from diﬀerences in non-picking tasks done in the ﬁrst and
second half of the season. On ﬁeld-days in which workers are only picking, we ﬁnd productivity
signiﬁcantly rises after the introduction of piece rates.
In column 2, we restrict the sample to ten days either side of the change in incentive scheme.
Over this shorter time frame, productivity still rises by 39%. As before, the coeﬃcient is signiﬁ-
cant at the 1% level.
Column 3 restricts the sample to workers picking on the two main ﬁelds that operated for the
most amount of time under both incentive schemes. This reduces the variation in productivity
22Controlling for lagged weather conditions and/or rainfall led to similar results.
14arising from diﬀerences across ﬁelds. Again, productivity signiﬁcantly rises in these two ﬁelds.
Robustness Checks
The ﬁnal set of robustness checks are in table 5. In the ﬁr s tt w oc o l u m n sw es i m u l a t et h e
introduction of piece rates in ﬁelds and for workers that did not actually experience the change
in incentive schemes. We proceed as follows.
F i r s tn o t et h a ti nt h et w om a i nﬁelds operated for the most days under both incentive
schemes, the change in incentive scheme occurred 25% of the way through each ﬁeld’s life cycle.
If productivity jumps naturally 25% of the way through a ﬁeld’s life cycle, the eﬀect of piece
rates would be overestimated. To check for this we construct a fake piece rate for each ﬁeld,
that is set equal to one after a ﬁeld has passed 25% of its life cycle and zero otherwise. We then
take the sample of ﬁelds that have only operated under either relative incentives or piece rates
and see if productivity jumps at this stage of the ﬁeld life cycle. The result in column 1 shows
no evidence of a natural jump in productivity on ﬁelds after they have passed 25% of their life
cycle.
Column 2 exploits the same idea but at the worker level. In the baseline sample, worker’s
had been picking for an average of 19 days before the incentive scheme changed. If workers
typically exhibit a change in productivity after this time, we would incorrectly attribute this to
the introduction of piece rates. To check for this, we exploit information on workers who arrived
after the introduction of piece rates. We create a fake piece rate for each such worker set equal
to one after that worker has been picking for 19 days. The result in column 2 shows no evidence
of a natural jump in worker productivity after this time.
The second set of robustness checks relate to potentially endogenous behavioral responses by
workers and management to the change in incentives.
An identifying assumption underlying (6) is that workers do not anticipate the change in
incentive scheme. To check this, column 3 introduces a dummy equal to one in the week prior to
the change in incentives. This dummy is not signiﬁcant, while the coeﬃcient on the piece rate
remains signiﬁcant and of similar magnitude to the baseline speciﬁcation in column 4 of table 2.
Another concern is that the exact date at which the incentive scheme was changed may have
been an endogenous response by management to lower than expected productivity in the ﬁrst half
of the season. To assess the quantitative importance of this, we drop the last 10 days of picking
under relative incentives from the sample. The result in column 4 shows that the estimated
rise in productivity is greater than in the baseline speciﬁc a t i o n . T h i si sn o tc o n s i s t e n tw i t h
management changing the incentive scheme when productivity was at its lowest point. Indeed
the previous result in column 3 showed productivity was not falling in the week prior to the move
to piece rates.
The descriptive analysis in section 3 highlighted that workers become worse oﬀ under piece
15rates - they pick more kilograms per hour than under the relative incentive scheme, and on average
receive the same total daily compensation. It is thus plausible that after the introduction of piece
rates, workers had incentives to under perform. By doing so they may have hoped to convince
the management that the relative incentive scheme was not responsible for lower productivity in
the ﬁr s th a l fo ft h es e a s o n .
To check for this, we drop the ﬁrst ten days of picking under piece rates from the sample.
The result in column 5 shows that the productivity increase is indeed higher if this initial period
is omitted. This is consistent both with workers deliberately under performing in the hope of
re-installing relative incentives, or with workers responding with a lag because of learning.
A related issue is that workers may under perform also under piece rates if they believe that
working hard will result in lower piece rates in the future. One testable implication is that this
type of ratchet eﬀect should be weaker the shorter the time horizon of the worker. Column 6
checks for this by controlling for a dummy whether the worker is in her last week of work - the
time at which this ratchet eﬀect is of least concern to the worker. We ﬁnd no diﬀerential eﬀect
on productivity at this time.23
Finally, column 7 analyses how the behavioral response of workers to the introduction of
piece rates changes with time. We use the number of days piece rates have been in place as a
measure of tenure under piece rates, and introduce an interaction between this and the piece rate
dummy.24 The result shows the interaction between tenure and piece rates to be signiﬁcant and
positive. However, the magnitude of this eﬀect is equal and opposite to the coeﬃcient on the
time trend in this speciﬁcation.25 Hence productivity was actually declining under the relative
incentives, all else equal, and there is no signiﬁcant trend in productivity under piece rates.26
Section 8.3 in the appendix reports further results on the eﬀect of the change in incentives
over time.
One ﬁnal concern is that the increase in productivity came at the expense of the quality of
fruit picked. Pickers are expected to classify fruit as either class one - suitable as supermarket
produce, or class two - suitable as market produce. Theories of multi—tasking suggest that if
23This type of concern of employees was documented in Roy’s (1952) study of industrial workers. He provides
evidence that workers set informal quotas in response to ratchet concerns.
24There is no variation across workers in tenure so deﬁned. We also experimented with an alternative deﬁnition
o ft e n u r eb a s e do nt h en u m b e ro fd a y seach worker had been picking under piece rates. The results proved to be
very similar with both measures.
25In this speciﬁcation, the coeﬃcient on the time trend is -.024 with standard error of .005.
26This is in contrast to the results in Paarsch and Shearer (1996). They ﬁnd that for tree planters in British
Columbia, although individual productivity signiﬁcantly increases moving from ﬁxed wages to piece rates, it sub-
sequently declines over time. They attribute this to planters becoming tired. The downward trend in productivity
under relative incentives is however consistent with recent experimental evidence in public goods games in which
contributions are found to increase if players are able to communicate and sanction one another. See Masclet et
al (2003) for a recent contribution.
16workers are given incentives for only one task - picking, they devote less eﬀort to the unrewarding
task - the correct classiﬁcation of fruit quality (Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), Baker (1992)).
This is especially pertinent in this context because misclassiﬁcations of fruit cannot be traced
back to individuals workers. To check for this we analyze whether the misclassiﬁcation of fruit
worsened after the introduction of piece rates. Results, reported in section 8.4 of the appendix,
show this was not the case.
Summary
Taken together, the results show that moving from a relative incentive scheme to piece rates
signiﬁcantly increased worker productivity by at least 50%. The quantitative and qualitative
signiﬁcance of the result is robust to alternative speciﬁcations that reduce other potential sources
of variation in productivity over time. These include those arising at the level of the farm, across
ﬁelds, and within workers over time.27
Furthermore, as workers’ pay remained constant under both incentive schemes, while pro-
ductivity increased, this estimated increase in productivity is a lower bound on the pure eﬀect
of the change in incentives, holding worker utility constant. In what follows we analyze whether
workers’ behavior is consistent with individual utility maximization under the two schemes.
5 Workers’ Behavior: Individualistic or Cooperative?
If workers are of heterogeneous ability and each chooses eﬀo r tt om a x i m i z et h e i ro w nn e tb e n e ﬁt,
standard theory predicts that the mean and variance of eﬀort across workers rise moving from
relative incentives to piece rates, as summarized in proposition 1. In this section we analyze
whether workers choose their equilibrium eﬀort levels in accordance with this framework or
whether, in contrast, they internalize the externality their eﬀort imposes on other workers under
the relative scheme.
T ot h i sp u r p o s ew ed e r i v et h eﬁrst order conditions of the workers’ utility maximization
problem under these alternative behavioral assumptions and then check whether these can be
reconciled with the observed change in productivity. To do so, we use the ﬁrst order conditions
of their maximization problem to compute an estimate of the cost parameter, θi, under each
incentive scheme and each behavioral assumption. Since the workers’ cost (ability) parameters
27We also examined which individual characteristics explain the diﬀerence in productivity between the incentive
schemes. We found no aﬀect of self-reported mathematical ability on productivity, suggesting that confusion over
how the relative incentive scheme operated is unlikely to explain the rise in productivity. Workers that came to
work speciﬁcally as part of their university course, had signiﬁcantly higher productivity under relative incentives.
This may reﬂect that these workers had relatively more to lose from being caught shirking. Finally, workers that
reported themselves to being “popular”, had larger increases in productivity moving to piece rates. This hints
at the possibility that relationships among workers may play a role in workplace behavior - the subject of the
remainder of the paper. These results are available upon request.
17are innate, we ought to ﬁnd the same implied distributions of costs across workers under both
incentive schemes if the underlying behavioral assumption is correct.
To proceed, in section 5.1 we ﬁrst recover an estimate of workers’ eﬀort from the productivity
data, namely we separate out all other factors that aﬀect productivity in any ﬁeld-day. Section
5.2 shows that, not surprisingly, the observed change in productivity is too large to be consistent
with workers maximizing their individual rewards net of disutility costs. Section 5.3 shows that
workers do not cooperate fully either - in other words they do not behave as if maximizing the
sum of individual utilities. In section 5.4 we posit that workers have social preferences and
recover the weight workers place on the net beneﬁts of all others which is consistent with the
observed change in productivity.
5.1 Workers’ Eﬀort
We assume that workers’ eﬀort e translates into productivity y through a Cobb Douglas produc-
tion function. This speciﬁcation ensures that the same eﬀort can lead to two diﬀerent levels of
productivity depending on other inputs into production, such as ﬁeld conditions. To estimate
worker eﬀort, we ﬁrst run the productivity regression (6) by each incentive scheme, controlling
for the same determinants of productivity as in the baseline speciﬁcation of column 4 in table
2. An estimate of worker i’s eﬀort in ﬁeld f on day t under scheme s is each worker’s estimated
ﬁxed eﬀect added to the residual from this regression;
b e
s
ift = b α
s
i + b u
s
ift (7)
The ﬁrst term captures the workers average eﬀort over time under incentive scheme s.T h e
second term captures how much of the worker’s productivity cannot be explained by observables -
ﬁeld ﬁxed eﬀects, a time trend, ﬁeld life cycle, and the worker’s picking experience. This residual
is interpreted as the workers deviation from her average eﬀort level under each incentive scheme.
This method thus provides an estimate of each workers eﬀort on every ﬁeld-day on which they
pick.
Figure 6a shows the kernel density estimate of the distribution of worker’s eﬀort across ﬁeld-
days. Consistent with the actual distribution of productivity by incentive scheme in ﬁgure 3, the
mean and variance of eﬀort both rise signiﬁcantly moving from relative incentives to piece rates.
Figure 6b plots each workers mean eﬀort under piece rates against that under relative incen-
tives. Few workers lie below the 450 line - nearly all put in more eﬀort under piece rates than
under relative incentives. The correlation between estimated eﬀorts across incentive schemes is
.4648. Hence there is little evidence of churning of workers - those who put in the most eﬀort
18under relative incentives continue to exert the most eﬀort under piece rates and vice versa.28
Figures 7a and 7b split the estimated eﬀort (7) into each of its components - the residual,
b us
ift,a n dt h ew o r k e rﬁxed eﬀect, b α
s
i. Figure 7a shows the exponent of the residuals. Under the
two schemes these are centred around zero. Workers do not systematically exert more or less
eﬀort than would be predicted by the baseline regression speciﬁcation.
Figure 7b shows the distribution of worker ﬁxed eﬀects - a measure of the average eﬀort the
worker puts in under each incentive scheme. It is clear that these ﬁxed eﬀects, and not the
residuals, drive the diﬀerence in the distributions of eﬀort in ﬁgure 6a.
5.2 Individualistic Behavior
Suppose workers choose eﬀort to maximize their own net beneﬁt, ignoring the negative externality
their eﬀort imposes on co-workers. Using the framework developed in section 2, noting that
productivity is observable, and that eﬀort and productivity are related through a Cobb Douglas
production function, the ﬁrst order conditions for eﬀort under relative incentives and piece rates

























For a given beneﬁt function, φ(.), estimated eﬀort, ei,a n dp i c k i n gr a t e ,β, each of these can
be solved for each worker’s θi. If workers choose their eﬀort levels to maximize their own net
beneﬁts under each incentive scheme, the implied distribution of the cost parameter should be
the same across incentive schemes.
We assume the beneﬁt function is of the following CRRA type;
φ(y)=ρy
1
ρ for ρ ≥ 1 (8)
The eﬀort levels estimated above are substituted into the ﬁrst order conditions (30)a n d( 40),
which are then solved for the workers cost parameter. The data identiﬁes the group of workers
for each ﬁeld-day. This allows us to construct a measure of the average eﬀort level in the ﬁeld-
day, which enters the ﬁrst order condition under relative incentives. To estimate the ﬁrst order
condition under piece rates (40), we exploit information on the ﬁeld-day speciﬁc picking rate, β.29
28An alternative way to state this is that each workers relative ranking of eﬀort remains unchanged moving
from one incentive scheme to the other.
29These data are recorded using the same technology that records worker productivity each ﬁeld-day. Hence
we are able to match each worker-ﬁeld-day observation with a corresponding picking rate under piece rates.
19Having obtained an estimate of θi on each ﬁeld-day the worker picks, we take the median of
each worker’s estimated θi as a unique estimate of θi, under each incentive scheme. Intuitively,
if workers choose their eﬀort levels according to (30)a n d( 40), the implied distribution of costs
across workers should then be the same under both incentive schemes.
Figure 8a shows the kernel density estimate of the distribution of workers’ cost of eﬀort under
each incentive scheme. The distribution of cost parameters under relative incentives lies almost
entirely to the right of the distribution under piece rates. It is clear that the same distribution
of costs cannot be ﬁtted to both incentive schemes.30
An interpretation of this is that given the observed change in productivity over time, the
distribution of cost parameters under the two incentives schemes would have to be as shown in
ﬁgure 8a. In other words, to generate the signiﬁcant increase in productivity after piece rates are
introduced, workers must face signiﬁcantly higher costs of exerting eﬀort under relative incentives
than piece rates, if indeed workers’ eﬀort choices are determined by the ﬁrst order conditions (30)
and (40).
Since worker cost is an innate parameter, the implied distributions of costs ought to have
been the same under both incentive schemes if workers eﬀort choices were actually determined by
these ﬁrst order conditions. As this hypothesis is resoundingly rejected by the data, we explore
alternative hypotheses of how workers may be choosing their eﬀort levels.31
5.3 Cooperative Behavior
Suppose workers choose their eﬀort levels cooperatively, namely to maximize the utility of the
entire group. This behavioral assumption might be appropriate if the conditions of the folk
theorem apply. If the gain from choosing eﬀorts cooperatively is large enough and workers play
trigger strategies, no worker has an incentive to deviate and induce punishment. Punishment may
be relatively easy in this setting both because deviations can be easily observed given workers
work side-by-side, and because workers interact along a number of social dimensions, giving them
30Similar results obtain if the mean of each worker’s estimated cost parameter is used instead. The advantage
of this method is that we impose no distributional assumptions on θ. Alternatively, (30)a n d( 40) can be estimated
using maximum likelihood for a given distribution of θ.
31Suppose workers’ strategies have two components - how much eﬀort to exert and the variability of eﬀort. For
example, if workers experiment with diﬀerent picking techniques they will have a higher variance of productivity
over time. Under relative incentives, there may be an incentive for low ability workers to experiment more. This
is because with a minimum wage guarantee always in place, a high variance strategy has little cost if the outcome
is bad, and will increase pay when the outcome moves the worker closer to, or above, the average. High ability
workers have no such incentives to choose high variance strategies. To check for this, we calculated the correlation
between worker’s variance of productivity and their estimated cost parameter under piece rates for ρ =2 .T h i s
correlation was .0837. Hence low ability workers have slightly more variable productivity under relative incentives,
but this correlation is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
20access to a number of punishment mechanisms.32
































Under piece rates, the eﬀort level chosen by worker i does not aﬀect the utility of other
workers in the group. Hence the ﬁrst order condition is the same as in the individualistic case,
(40).
Following the same methodology as above, we derive the implied distribution of the cost
parameter under each incentive scheme, now assuming that eﬀort levels are chosen according to
(9) and (40).
Figure 8b shows the implied distributions of the cost parameter θi, by incentive scheme. The
distribution of θi under piece rates is, by deﬁnition, unchanged to that derived in the previous
section. However, the distribution of costs under relative incentives now lies almost entirely to
the left of the distribution under piece rates.
If workers chose their eﬀort levels cooperatively, then the disutility of eﬀort under relative
incentives would have to be signiﬁcantly lower under relative incentives to ﬁt the observed
productivity data. This is because productivity is actually too high under relative incentives if
workers are choosing their eﬀort levels cooperatively. Indeed, ﬁgure 8b shows that a signiﬁcant
fraction of workers have to have a near zero cost of eﬀort for the observed data under relative
incentives to be consistent with workers choosing the cooperative eﬀort levels.
Figures 8a and 8b together reveal an interesting pattern. The assumption of individualistic
behavior can only be reconciled with the observed change in productivity if workers have higher
costs of eﬀort under relative incentives vis-à-vis piece rates. The assumption of cooperative
b e h a v i o rc a no n l yb er e c o n c i l e dw i t ho b s e r v e dp r o d u c t i v i t yi fw o r k e r sh a v elower costs under
relative incentives vis-à-vis piece rates. This suggests workers internalize the negative externality
to some extent. The next subsection explores this idea in more detail.
5.4 Social Preferences
The salient distinction between the two incentive schemes is the presence of a negative externality
under relative incentives. The negative externality arises because as a given worker increases her
32Workers live together on the farm for the picking season. Many workers also study with their co-workers in
their home country, or are already friends before arriving at the farm.
33Note that if workers were of homogeneous ability the Pareto optimum would require all to extert the minimum
feasible level of eﬀort.
21eﬀort, she worsens the relative performance, and hence the beneﬁts, accruing to co-workers. The
fact that neither the individualistic nor the fully cooperative model ﬁt the data suggests workers
may internalize this negative externality to some extent.
To explore this further we follow the recent experimental economics literature and posit each

















Workers are thus heterogeneous in two dimensions - their disutility of eﬀort (θi), and the
“social weight” they attach to the beneﬁts of all others (πi).
These social preferences can be thought of as a reduced form representation of behavior
consistent with reciprocity or altruism (Fehr and Schmidt (1999)), or the evolutionary equilibrium
of a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game in which workers learn which strategies to play (Levine
and Pesendorfer (2002), Sethi and Somanathan (1999)).
































There is a wedge between the ﬁrst order conditions (30) and (11). This wedge is the extent
to which the negative externality imposed on others is taken account of by worker i.
Under piece rates, in contrast, the ﬁrst order condition for eﬀort is the same as when workers
are assumed to be individualistically motivated. The reasoning is straightforward - under piece
rates no externalities arise from each workers eﬀort and so even if individuals place positive
weight on the beneﬁts of others, this does not aﬀect their own optimal choice of eﬀort.
Deﬁning social preferences this way allows us to capture two special cases. If πi =0for
all workers, the ﬁrst order conditions coincide with those under individualistic behavior (30). If
πi =1for all workers, the ﬁrst order conditions coincide with those under cooperative behavior
(9).
In order to derive the distribution of social weights that ﬁt the productivity data, we assume
t h et r u ec o s to fe ﬀort of each worker is that derived under piece rates.34 Given b θi,w es o l v e( 1 1 )
for the implied social weight of each worker under the relative incentive scheme. To be clear, this
is the implied distribution of social weights that is consistent with the change in productivity
across the two incentive schemes, assuming the true cost parameter of each worker is that derived
34Under this assumption we can test whether groups became more or less heterogeneous with the move to
piece rate. We ﬁnd that groups were equally heterogeneous, in terms of ability, before and after the change in
incentives.
22under piece rates.
The resulting distribution of social weights is shown in ﬁgure 9. The implied distribution of
s o c i a lw e i g h t si sr o b u s tt ot h i sc h o i c eo ft h ep a r a m e t e rρ in the beneﬁtf u n c t i o n( 8 ) .
For ρ =2 , the average worker places a social weight of .65 on the beneﬁts of all others in the
same ﬁeld-day. Less than 3% of workers have an implied social weight greater than one, and less
than 2% of workers have an implied social weight of less than zero.35
In summary, under relative incentives workers behave as if they internalize the externality
they impose on others to some extent. The average worker places just under twice the weight
on their own private beneﬁts, as on the beneﬁts accruing to all others. As the estimated social
weight each worker places on others varies by ﬁeld-day, the next section explores how observable
factors on the ﬁeld-day explain the workers’ behavior under relative incentives over time.
6 Incentives, Social Networks and Workers’ Productivity
A natural candidate to explain the extent to which workers internalize the negative externality
their eﬀort imposes on others is the relationship among workers in any given ﬁeld-day. To
this purpose we use information on the number of self-reported friends that each worker works
alongside with on a given ﬁeld-day.36 Each worker was asked to name up to ﬁve people they
were friends with on the farm. We would expect workers to internalize the externality more and
hence to be less productive when the externality hurts their friends rather than other workers.
To investigate this issue, Table 6 presents estimates of the productivity regression (6) under
relative incentives, where we now additionally control for group composition at the ﬁeld-day
level, as well as the baseline determinants of worker productivity as in column 4 of table 2. Note
that we identify the eﬀect of group composition on productivity by comparing the productivity
of the same worker working within diﬀerent groups on diﬀerent days when relative incentives
are in place.
Column 1a controls for the share of co-workers in the same ﬁeld that are friends of worker
i. Having more friends present signiﬁcantly reduces productivity under relative incentives. The
estimated coeﬃcient implies that if worker i m o v e df r o mag r o u pw i t hn of r i e n d st oag r o u p
where 10% of co-workers were her friends, her productivity would fall by 17%.
35A negative social weight can be interpreted as the worker being “spiteful” towards others (Levine and Pe-
sendorfer (2002)).
36Levine and Pesendorfer (2002) show that in an evolutionary equilibrium of a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
game in which workers learn which strategies to play, players behave as if they have social preferences. Moreover,
the weight each player places on the beneﬁts of another player depends on the relation between players. They
argue that, “individuals will behave more altruistically when they can identify with the beneﬁciary of their
altruism”.
23Column 1b controls for the share of workers in the same ﬁeld that are friends of worker i,a s
well as for the total number of workers in the ﬁeld-day, and an interaction between this and the
share of workers that are friends of i. We see that - (i) having more friends present signiﬁcantly
reduces productivity under relative incentives; (ii) this eﬀect is smaller the greater the number
of workers in the same ﬁeld. The latter is consistent with the fact that the externality imposed
by i on her friends is smaller when the overall group size is larger.37
The results in columns 1a and 1b have some obvious alternative interpretations - when workers
work alongside their friends, they exert less eﬀort and become less productive because they talk
and socialize with their friends. Or, alternatively, they may choose to work with their friends
when they feel less prone to work hard.
To shed light on these hypotheses we use the following intuition. Any relationship between
the composition of co-workers and productivity that is unrelated to the incentive scheme in place,
such as socializing with friends, will be present when either relative incentives or piece rates are
in place. If however the relationship between the composition of co-workers and productivity is
related to the incentive scheme in place, this relation should only arise under relative incentives.
Columns 2a and 2b then report the same productivity regressions as 1a and 1b when piece
rates are in place. In both cases the share of co-workers that are friends of i has no aﬀect on
productivity under piece rates.
In summary, the data does not allow us to tell whether workers internalize the externality
because they are altruistic towards their friends, or because of the threat of punishment and
retaliation by their friends. However, since workers’ productivity is not aﬀected by the presence
of friends under piece rates, we can rule out other potential explanations. The evidence does
support the hypotheses that productivity is lower when friends are present because workers
socialize with their friends, because of a norm of not working hard in the presence of friends, or
because workers self select to work alongside their friends when they do not intend to work hard.
Robustness Checks
The ﬁnding that the share of friends is a signiﬁcant negative determinant of productivity
under relative incentives only, may still be spurious for the following reason. If workers are
more likely to chat with friends, and not work, when they ﬁrst arrive, the eﬀect of friends on
37The share of friends on the ﬁeld can also be used to explain the worker’s derived daily social weight, πift.
In line with the productivity results, we ﬁnd that workers place a greater weight on the beneﬁts of co-workers
when a greater share of co-workers are their friends. The magnitude of the coeﬃcient implies that if worker i
went from having no friends working alongside her, to having only her friends working alongside her, her social
weight would rise by .454. We also ﬁnd evidence that this eﬀect is larger in smaller groups.and that workers’
social weights signiﬁcantly increase as the relative incentive scheme has been in place longer, controlling for their
own work experience. A possible explanation is that later arrivals learn from workers with more experience about
the negative externality under the relative incentive scheme. The data do not allow us to explore this possibility
further.
24productivity will only be picked up under the relative incentives scheme, as that was in place for
the ﬁrst half of the season. Indeed, any factor unrelated to incentives but that causes individuals
to treat friends diﬀerently over the season will be spuriously attributed to the change in incentive
scheme.
In order to check this, in column 1 of table 7 we examine if under piece rates, the eﬀect of
having more friends on the ﬁeld is diﬀerent for those that arrived later and so only worked under
piece rates, compared to those who were also present under the relative incentive scheme. We
see that for both types of worker, there is no eﬀect of the composition of workers in ﬁeld-day on
productivity under piece rates.
In column 2 we allow the eﬀect of group composition to vary by the number of co-workers in
the ﬁeld. There is still no aﬀect of group composition under piece rates, for both types of worker.
Taken together, the results suggest that individuals take account of the externality their eﬀort
imposes on their friends when they work under relative incentives. This result is not driven by
the nature of interaction between workers and their friends changing over time. The results in
t a b l e s6a n d7a l s oh o l df o ro t h e rd e ﬁnitions of friends - such as those individuals the worker
lives with. These results are available from the authors on request.38
7C o n c l u s i o n s
Using personnel data, we present evidence on workers’ productivity under two incentive schemes
- relative incentives and piece rates. We ﬁnd the introduction of piece rates led to a signiﬁcant
and permanent rise in productivity of at least 50%.
We show the rise in productivity is too large to be consistent with a model where workers
choose eﬀort to maximize their individual net beneﬁts and too small to be consistent with a model
were workers choose eﬀort levels cooperatively to maximize the group’s rewards.The evidence
suggests that instead workers behave as if they internalize the externality they impose on fellow
workers under relative incentives to some extent. In addition, workers appear to internalize the
externality more when a greater share of their co-workers are their close friends.
T h ec o n t r i b u t i o n so ft h ep a p e ra r et w o f o l d-ﬁrst, we present evidence on the role of incentives
on worker productivity across two common types of incentive scheme. Second, we shed light on
why productivity diﬀers over the two schemes. In doing so, we integrate recent insights from the
38If workers can devote eﬀort to helping others, they have less incentives to do so under more high powered
incentive schemes (Lazear (1989)). This idea has found empirical support in Drago and Garvey (1998). To check
whether this explains why friends do not determine productivity under piece rates, we asked workers from whom
they mainly learned to pick (we did not try to illicit workers own evaluations of how much help they oﬀered
to others). For workers in our baseline sample that worked at least 10 ﬁeld-days under both incentive schemes,
47% said they learned from practice, 26% from workers around them, 19% from supervisors, and 8% from their
friends. The corresponding ﬁgures for those who only worked under piece rates were 43%, 22%, 24% and 4%.
25literature on social preferences - that has largely been motivated by experimental evidence - with
the literature on the provision of incentives. To our knowledge, we provide the ﬁrst real world
evidence on the interplay between social preferences and behavioral responses to incentives.39
Throughout we have taken the incentive schemes as given. Our focus has been the response
of workers - agents - to a change in incentives. A separate issue is whether the observed incentive
schemes are indeed optimally designed by the principal. The natural question is if the relative
incentive scheme was detrimental to productivity, why was it ever adopted?
Incentive theory emphasizes that a principal may prefer relative to absolute performance eval-
uation when agents face common shocks. Such common shocks are important in the workplace
environment analyzed here.40
The superiority of relative incentives however relies on the assumption that workers play Nash
and maximize their individual rewards - namely they choose eﬀort to maximize their payoﬀ taking
as given the eﬀort chosen by others and ignoring the externality their eﬀort imposes on others.
Under these conditions the marginal beneﬁto fe ﬀort under relative and absolute incentives are
approximately equal for large group sizes.
This assumption on worker behavior is not supported in our data. Relative incentives led to
lower productivity because, perhaps surprisingly, workers internalized the negative externality
to some extent. In general, our analysis illustrates that understanding worker preferences is key
for the optimal choice between alternative incentive schemes.41
Finally, the fact that workers’ behavior depends on the identity of their co-workers suggests
two questions for future research.
First is the identiﬁcation of the causal eﬀect of worker i’s eﬀort on worker j’s eﬀort. The
identiﬁcation of such social eﬀects has been confounded by the “reﬂection problem” in much
of the existing literature. In this work environment, the composition of co-workers changes on
a daily basis. There are potentially exogenous sources of variation in group composition that
would aid identiﬁcation of social eﬀects across workers. Such spillovers may also diﬀer across
social networks and incentive schemes.
Second is the analysis of how group composition determines the extent to which workers inter-
nalize the externality under relative incentives. The literature on common resource management
39Hart (2001) reviews some of the recent theoretical literature incorporating the role of norms into the theory
of the ﬁrm. Rotemberg (1994) provides an analysis of the provision of incentives within ﬁrms when workers
endogenously choose their level of altruism towards co-workers.
40See Lazear and Rosen (1981), Nalebuﬀ and Stiglitz (1983) and Green and Stokey (1983). Relative performance
evaluation may also be preferred to piece rates as it lows informational rents to high types (Bhaskar (2002)), and
reduces incentives of workers to exert eﬀort in inﬂuence activity (Milgrom(1988)).
41The relative incentive scheme can be thought of as a group incentive scheme where worker’s pay increases
in their own eﬀort and decreases in the average eﬀort of all workers. An implication of the results is that there
ought to be further large productivity gains over piece rates if workers were rewarded positively for their own and
the group’s eﬀort.
26and group participation suggests that heterogeneity should play a major role. Our data allows
us to explore the extent to which the distribution of ability or other individual traits such as
nationality, within a group help or hinder cooperation under relative incentives. Such an analysis
would yield insights both for the optimal choice of group composition, and on the determinants
of cooperation in a real world situation where individual and social optima do not coincide.42
Such research would complement the ﬁndings in this paper. Together, they shed new light on
and old idea - the interplay between social eﬀects and the provision of incentives within ﬁrms.43
8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Denote by eR
i and eP
i the equilibrium level of eﬀorts chosen by worker i under relative incentives
and piece rates, respectively.






















This ﬁrst order condition is violated if the worker exerted zero eﬀort as φ
0 (0) > 0. Hence ei > 0














































i ≥ 1 s ot h el e f th a n ds i d ei n( A 1 )i sg r e a t e rt h a n





< 1 so the right hand side is less than one - a contradiction. Hence
f o ra n yt w op a i ro fw o r k e r s(j,k) such that θj <θ k, eR
j >e R
k .T h i se s t a b l i s h e st h a tw o r k e r sw i t h
a lower disutility of eﬀort parameter exert more eﬀort. Consider the highest cost worker, i = N.
42In recent work on incentives within teams, Hamilton et al (2002) ﬁnd - (i) teams with a greater spread in
ability, holding average ability constant, are more productive; (ii) high ability workers have a stronger impact
on team productivity than low ability workers. These results are both consistent with high ability workers being
able to impose a higher team norm level of output, because they have higher outside options to within team
bargaining, or with high ability workers being able to teach low ability workers how to execute tasks better and
more quickly.
43The idea that human relations aﬀect workplace performance goes back to Mayo (1933), and Roethlisberger
and Dickson (1939).




















If this worker exerts zero eﬀort this ﬁrst order condition is violated as φ
0 (0) > 0. Hence ei > 0









































< 1 which is a contradiction. Hence for any two pair of workers (j,k) such
that θj <θ k, eP
j >e P
k . This establishes that lower cost workers put in more eﬀort.
















for all pairs (j,k) such that θj <θ k.















































Which after multiplying through by eR








where the second inequality follows from the fact that at the same average level of eﬀort, the





i6=k eR < 1. Hence eP
i >e R
i for all i so that average eﬀort is higher under piece rates
than relative incentives.
Given that the ratio of eﬀort of any two consecutive types is greater under piece rates, it
follows that the variance of eﬀort is higher under piece rates than relative incentives.




i6=k eR =1 ,e ﬀort under the two incentive schemes is the
same when the group size becomes large.44¥
8.2 Piece Rates and Productivity Over Time
Table A1 presents results related to the eﬀect of incentives on productivity over time.
First, workers that have been picking for longer under relative incentives may be more en-
trenched into a particular set of work habits. If so we would expect a diﬀerential response across
workers to the introduction of piece rates, depending on their work experience under relative
incentives. In column 1 of table A1, we allow both the eﬀects of piece rates and tenure to depend
on how long each worker has been working under the relative incentive scheme. To this purpose
we interact the piece rate and the tenure variables with the individual worker’s experience under
relative incentives in deviation from the mean.
The result shows that workers more used to picking under relative incentives have a signiﬁ-
cantly larger increase in their productivity once piece rates are introduced. The marginal eﬀect
of the piece rate varies from .55 for the workers with the least experience at the time of intro-
duction to .72 for the workers with the most experience. At the average experience level under
relative incentives, the marginal eﬀect is .63. The trend in productivity under piece rates does
not however diﬀer depending on workers’ total experience under relative incentives.






































Under piece rates the ﬁrst order condition for worker i is;
βφ
0 (βei) − ei =0
Evaluating the ﬁrst order conditions of problems (1) and (2) at β = 1
e so that the marginal beneﬁto fe ﬀort is the




29The ﬁnal two columns compare the workers in our sample - who worked at least 10 ﬁeld-
days under each incentive scheme, to other workers who did not. These other workers either
only picked under relative incentives or piece rates, or arrived just prior to, or just after, the
introduction of piece rates. We restrict the sample to the ﬁrst four weeks any worker picks to
compare these groups of workers at similar levels of work experience.
Column 2 identiﬁes whether productivity under piece rates is diﬀerent for workers who have
experienced both incentive schemes for at least 10 ﬁeld-days, compared to other workers. Re-
assuringly, the result suggests that this is not the case. Moreover using this larger sample of
workers, the pattern of coeﬃcients on the other controls remains similar to that in the baseline
speciﬁcation. In short, there is no evidence to suggest that workers observed at least 10 ﬁeld-days
under both schemes respond diﬀerently to incentives to workers that arrive at a diﬀerent part of
the season.
In column 3 we interact workers experience with whether the worker has experienced both
incentive schemes for at least 10 ﬁeld-days. It is again reassuring to see that the returns to
experience do not diﬀer between the two groups of workers. This supports the hypothesis that
the speed of learning to pick does not vary over the season.
These results support the hypothesis that the sample of workers used for the main analysis
do not diﬀer from those who arrived earlier or later in the season.
8.3 Quality and Quantity
The evidence presented earlier suggested that the operation of the farm did not change along
a number of important margins over the season - the stock of workers available, the length of
the working day, and the allocation of supervisors. However one margin that may have been
unintentionally aﬀected by the change in incentives is the quality of picking.
Pickers are expected to classify fruit as either class one - suitable as supermarket produce, or
class two - suitable as market produce. This classiﬁcation takes place within the ﬁeld by each
worker as they pick. Each class of fruit is then placed into a separate punnet. After fruit has
been picked it is transported to a cooled warehouse for packing. In the packhouse each punnet
passes through a quality check. Whenever a class two fruit is detected in a class one punnet, it is
removed - downgraded - and transferred to a class two punnet. By the time the fruit picked from
ag i v e nﬁeld-day arrives in the farm packhouse for inspection, misclassiﬁcations of fruit cannot
be traced back to individual workers.
The electronic system used to record individual productivity data is not the same as that
which records misclassiﬁcations of fruit at the ﬁeld-day level in the packhouse. It is thus not
possible to match every ﬁeld-day from the productivity and packhouse databases. However we
30a r ea b l et od ot h i sf o ras u b s a m p l eo f6 7ﬁeld-days. In this sample, 30 ﬁeld-days were operated
under relative incentives, 37 were operated under piece rates.45
In table A2 we assess whether the trade-oﬀ between the quality and quantity of picking
changed signiﬁcantly with the change in incentive scheme. The measure of the quality of picking
is the log of the ratio of the total fruit of class two that is misclassiﬁed as class one, to the
total fruit picked classiﬁed as class two. On average under relative incentives, 15% of fruit is
misclassiﬁed as class one. Under piece rates this falls to 12%, although this diﬀerence is not
signiﬁcant.
In column 1 we regress this measure of the quality of picking on a dummy for the introduction
of the piece rate and ﬁeld ﬁxed eﬀects. The incentive scheme in place has no aﬀect on the quality
of picking. Column 2 shows this to be the case when the tons of class two fruit picked is controlled
for. In column 3 we additionally control for a time trend, its square. We ﬁnd that the level of
misclassiﬁcation of fruit picked increases over time, but at a decreasing rate.
Finally, column 4 additionally controls for the ﬁeld life cycle, and meteorological factors.
Again the quality of picking does not respond to the change in incentives.
The productivity gains achieved under piece rates were not at the expense of a lower quality
of picking. Combined with the fact that worker pay remained constant over the season, the
change in incentives unambiguously led farm management to become better oﬀ.
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i eFigure 1: Productivity (kilogram/hour) Over the Season
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Notes: In figure 2, average productivity on the two main fields is shown for those workers that work at least 10 field-days 
under each incentive scheme. These fields are operated for the greatest number of days under each incentive scheme. 
Together they contribute one third of the total worker-field-day observations. The kernel density estimates in figure 3 are 
calculated using an Epanechnikov kernel.
First Field Second Field
May 31st June 30th July 31st            Aug 31st
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Productivity (kilogram/hour)Figure 3: Cumulative Distribution of Arrival and Departure of Workers
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    April 30th      May 31st      June 30th        July 31st      Aug 31st     Sept 30th     April 5th
Departures
Notes: The sample for this figure includes all workers on the farm that are available for picking.Figure 4a: Aggregate Kilos Picked Per Day Over the Season
Figure 4b: Aggregate Hours Worked Per Day Over the Season
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nFigure 5a: Picking Rates Over the Season

















































Notes: Sample sizes are the same as those used for the productivity regressions. The series for the daily rate is an average 
over all fields operated on each day. This average is weighted by the number of man-hours on each field-day. The series for 









































































































Introduction of Piece Rates
Introduction of Piece Rates
May 31st June 30th July 31st     Aug 31st
May 31st June 30th July 31st     Aug 31stFigure 6a: Kernel Density Estimates of Effort by Incentive Scheme
Figure 6b: Scatter Plot of Efforts in the Two Incentive Schemes
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The total cost of effort is assumed to be quadratic in effort.
(mean) aveeffort_a
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Notes: Kernel density estimates are calculated using an Epanechnikov kernel. The underlying benefit function used to 
estimate worker effort is assumed to be;Figure 7a: Residuals by Incentive Scheme
Figure 7b: Kernel Density Estimates of Fixed Effects
by Incentive Scheme
lresA
 density: lresA  density: lresP


























Notes: Both figures are for the 142 workers in the productivity regressions. The residuals for each worker-field-day 
observation are derived from estimating the baseline productivity specification, in column 4 of table 3. The kernel 
density estimates are calculated using an Epanechnikov kernel. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality of distributions test 
rejects the null against a one-sided alternative that the fixed effects under relative incentives are lower than under the 
piece rate (p-value .000.).
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Fixed EffectFigure 8a: Kernel Density Estimates of Disutility of Effort Parameter,         
by Incentive Scheme Assuming Individualistic Behavior
Figure 8b: Kernel Density Estimates of Disutility of Effort Parameter,         
by Incentive Scheme Assuming Cooperative Behavior
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Disutility of Effort Parameter (θ) Under 
Piece Rate
Disutility of Effort Parameter (θ) Under 
Relative Incentives



































Disutility of Effort Parameter (θ) 
Under Piece Rate
Disutility of Effort Parameter (θ) Under Relative 
Incentives
Notes: Kernel density estimates are calculated using an Epanechnikov kernel. The underlying benefit function is assumed 
to be;
The total cost of effort is assumed to be quadratic in effort. Under individualistic behavior we imply the worker chooses their 
effort to maximize their own net benefits. Under cooperative behavior we imply the worker chooses their effort level to 
maximize the sum of all workers utilities.
Cost of Effort Parameter (θ)
2
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2 ) ( y y = ϕFigure 9: Kernel Density Estimates of Social Weight (π)
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Notes: Kernel density estimates are calculated using an Epanechnikov kernel. The underlying benefit function is 
assumed to be;
The total cost of effort is assumed to be quadratic in effort. 
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2 ) ( y y = ϕTable 1: Unconditional Differences in Productivity, by Incentive Scheme






Entire Sample 5.01 7.98
(.243) (.208)
[ 4.53, 5.49 ] [ 7.57, 8.39 ]
5.19 8.12
(.317) (.234)
[ 4.57, 5.82 ] [ 7.66, 8.58 ]
4.44 7.21
(.361) (.377)
[ 3.72, 5.15 ] [ 6.46, 7.95 ]
4.72 9.10
(.206) (.312)
[ 4.32, 5.13 ] [ 8.49, 9.72 ]
   2.97***
   2.77***
Limit Sample to Ten Days Before and After 
Introduction of the Piece Rate
Limit Sample to Two Main Fields
Limit Sample to Workers that Have Only 
Been Picking
   4.38***
   2.93***
Notes : *** denotes significance at 1%. Sample sizes are the same as those used for the productivity regressions. Standard 
errors and confidence intervals take account of the observations being clustered by field-day.Table 2: The Effect of Piece Rates on Productivity
Dependent Variable = Log of worker's productivity (kilogram picked per hour per field-day)







Piece rate    .530***    .515***    .460***    .577***
(.059) (.056) (.070) (.098)
Time trend .004
(.003)
Field life cycle    -1.16***
(.362)
Worker experience    .077***
(.031)
Worker fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Field fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared .1607 .2925 .3407 .3640
Number of observations             
(worker-field-day)
10215 10215 10215 10215
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Standard errors are clustered at the field-day level. All continuous variables are in logs. The 
sample is restricted to workers who have worked at least 10 days under both incentive schemes. There are 142 workers, 22 fields and 108 days in the sample.Table 3: The Effect of Piece Rates on Productivity - Omitted Factors
Dependent Variable = Log of worker's productivity (kilogram picked per hour per field-day)
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses, allowing for clustering at field-day level
(1) Meteorology (2) Supervisors (3) Shirking
Piece rate    .554***    .524***    .523***
(.096) (.101) (.101)
Time trend .004 .005 .005
(.003) (.003) (.003)
Field life cycle    -1.28***    -1.36***    -1.36***
(.360) (.372) (.372)
Worker experience    .078***    .080***    .081***
(.030) (.029) (.029)
Minimum temperature   .302**   .305**   .304**
(.134) (.138) (.138)
Maximum temperature .143 .177 .163
(.254) (.271) (.271)




Worker fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Field fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
No Yes Yes
(.0000) (.0000)
Adjusted R-squared .3745 .3948 .3950
10215
Supervisor fixed effects                       
Joint F-test (p-value)
Number of observations             
(worker-field-day)
10215 10215
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Robust standard errors are calculated throughout, allowing for 
standard errors to be clustered at the field-day level. All continuous variables are in logs. The sample is restricted to workers who 
have worked at least 10 days under both incentive schemes. Temperature variables correspond to a 0900-0900 time frame. Hours 
of sunshine are measured daily.Table 4: Alternative Comparison Groups
Dependent Variable = Log of worker's productivity (kilogram picked per hour per field-day)
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses, allowing for clustering at field-day level
(1) Only Picking (2) Twenty Days (3) Main Fields
Piece rate    .644***    .387***    .610***
(.113) (.110) (.070)
Worker fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Field fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls Yes No No
Adjusted R-squared .3704 .2922 .4032
Number of observations               
(worker-field-day)
2969 7077 3404
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Robust standard errors are calculated throughout, allowing for 
clustering at the field-day level in all columns. All continuous variables are in logs. The sample is restricted to workers who 
have worked at least 10 days under both incentive schemes. The sample in column 1 is restricted to workers that have only 
been picking on that day. The sample in column 2 is restricted to 10 days either side of the change in incentive schemes. The 
sample in column 3 is restricted to the two main fields operated on over the season. Other controls include worker picking 
experience, field life cycle, and a linear time trend.Table 5: Robustness Checks
Dependent Variable = Log of worker's productivity (kilogram picked per hour per field-day)
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses, allowing for clustering at field-day level
(1) Fake Piece 
Rate
(2) Fake Piece 
Rate
(3) Anticipation
(4) Drop Last 10 
Days Under Relative 
Incentives
(5) Drop First 10 Days 
Under Piece Rate
(6) Last Week (7) Tenure
Piece rate    .456***    .753***    .719***    .577***    .629***









   .027***
(.005)
Worker fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Field fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared .4927 .5921 .3665 .3813 .4245 .3640 .3950
2863 879
Dummy equal to one for the week 
prior to the introduction of the 
piece rate
Fake piece rate based on field life 
cycle
Fake piece rate based on number of 
days present on the farm
Number of observations               
(worker-field-day)
Tenure under piece rates
Dummy equal to one if it is the last 
week of picking for the worker
10215 9340 8873 10215 10215
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Robust standard errors are calculated throughout, allowing for clustering at the field-day level in all columns. All continuous variables are in logs. In columns 3 to 7 the 
sample is restricted to workers who have worked at least 10 days under both incentive schemes. The tenure variable controls for the number of days piece rates have been in place for. Other controls include worker picking 
experience, field life cycle, and a linear time trend.Table 6: The Effect of Group Composition on Productivity by Incentive Scheme
Dependent Variable = Log of worker's productivity (kilogram picked per hour per field-day)
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses, allowing for clustering at field-day level
                      
Share of workers in the field that are friends    -1.68***   -5.52** .072 1.17
(.647) (2.36) (.493) (1.60)
  1.60** -.285
(.684) (.501)
Number of workers in same field x 10
-2 .182 .085
(.117) (.069)
Worker fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Field fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared .3470 .3620 .3065 .3081
Share of workers in the field that are friends x 
number of workers in same field
Number of observations (worker-field-day) 4400
(2b)             
Piece Rates
4400 2860
(1a)                
Relative Incentives
(2a)             
Piece Rates
(1b)                
Relative Incentives
2860
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Robust standard errors are calculated throughout, allowing for clustering at the field-day level. All continuous variables are in logs. The 
sample is restricted to workers who have worked at least 10 field-days under both incentive schemes. Other controls include worker experience, field life cycle, and a linear time trend. Table 7: Robustness Checks on The Effects of Group Composition on Productivity by Incentive Scheme
Dependent Variable = Log of worker's productivity (kilogram picked per hour per field-day)
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses, allowing for clustering at field-day level
(1) (2)
                      













Worker fixed effects Yes Yes
Field fixed effects Yes Yes
Other Controls Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared .3619 .3636
Number of observations (worker-field-day) 4667
Share of workers in the field that are friends                                   
x number of workers in same field
Share of workers in the field that are friends x number of 
workers in same field x worked only under piece rates
Share of workers in the field that are friends                                   




Number of workers in same field                                                       
x worked only under piece rates x 10
-2
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Robust standard errors are calculated throughout, allowing for clustering 
at the field-day level. All continuous variables are in logs. Other controls include worker experience, field life cycle, and a linear time 
trend. The sample also includes workers that have only picked under piece rates.Table A1: Piece Rates and Productivity Over Time
Dependent Variable = Log of worker's productivity (kilogram picked per hour per field-day)
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses, allowing for clustering at field-day level
(1) Entrenchment (2) History (3) Learning
Piece rate  .630***    .485***    .546***
(.098) (.111) (.102)
Tenure    .029***
(.005)
Time trend    -.026***    -.012***    -.012***
(.005) (.004) (.004)
Field life cycle  -.620* -.429 -.432
(.365) (.372) (.373)
Worker experience    .206***   .064**  .055*
(.032) (.028) (.032)








Worker fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Field fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared .3956 .3117 .3115
Piece rate x [experience under relative scheme - 
mean experience under relative scheme]
Number of observations                                            
(worker-field-day)
Piece rate x have worked 10 field-days under 
both incentive schemes
9349 9349
Worker experience x have worked 10 field-days 
under both incentive schemes
10215
Tenure x  [experience under relative scheme - 
mean experience under relative scheme]x10
-3
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Robust standard errors are calculated throughout, allowing for clustering at 
the field-day level. All continuous variables are in logs. Confidence intervals for the marginal effect of the piece rate and tenure are both 
calculated at the mean experience under the average system. The final two columns compare the workers in our sample - who worked at 
least 10 field-days under each incentive scheme, to workers who did not. These workers include those who worked only under relative 
incentives or piece rates, or arrived just prior to, or just after, the introduction of piece rates. We restrict the sample to include only the first 
four weeks of picking for each worker. The tenure variable controls for the number of days piece rates have been in place for.Table A2: The Effect of Piece Rates on the Quality of Picking
Dependent Variable = Log of total fruit of class two misclassified as class one, at the packfield-day level
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Piece rate .330 .336 .434 .399
(.257) (.265) (.322) (.304)
Tons of class two fruit picked x 10
-3 -.794 -.401 -.249
(.845) (.780) (.859)
Time trend   .067**  .060*
(.032) (.033)
Time trend squared x 10
-3   -.349**   -.330**
(.146) (.151)






Hours of sunshine -.009
(.035)
Packfield fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared .0724 .0901 .1845 .2224
67
Number of observations                        
(field-day)
67 67 67
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Robust standard errors are calculated throughout. Data is based on the packhouse software 
system. It is assumed that all fruit arrives in the packhouse two days after it is picked. Variables are only available aggregated on field-day level where fields 
are further grouped according to fruit variety. This forms a packfield. The sample is restricted to those packfields that operated under both incentive 
schemes.  All right hand side variables are lagged by two days to allow for a time lag between picking and packing. Temperature variables correspond to a 
0900-0900 time frame. Hours of sunshine are measured daily.